understand implicit learning and implicit cognition, short of (1) denying the possibility of its existence (i.e., all causally efficacious representations are necessarily conscious to some extent), or (2) assuming the existence of an unconscious system ("a zombie") that is just as powerful as the conscious system, only minus consciousness. In contrast, I suggest that dynamical approaches, such as instantiated by connectionist models, make it clear how representations can be implicit in the senses of (1) being capable of influencing behavior in a way that does not require access or interpretation, and of (2) conveying information about task-relevant stimulus dimensions in a way that does not require explicit tokening of such dimensions. From this perspective thus, while awareness often accompanies learning, it is not always necessary for it to occur. NEURAL PLASTICITY
evaluating the predictions they make concerning overshadowing, the role of similarity in discrimination learning, and the effectiveness of retroactive interference. Taken together, the results that will be described lend more support to configural than elemental theories of learning. 
